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Abstract
We add an operation of group creation to the typed -calculus, where a group is a type for channels.
Creation of fresh groups has the effect of statically preventing certain communications, and can block the
accidental or malicious leakage of secrets. Intuitively, no channel belonging to a fresh group can be received
by processes outside the initial scope of the group, even if those processes are untyped. We formalize this
intuition by adapting a notion of secrecy introduced byAbadi, and proving a preservation of secrecy property.
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1. Introduction
Group creation is a natural extension of the sort-based type systems developed for the -calculus.
However, group creation has an interesting and subtle connection with secrecy. We start from the
untyped -calculus, where an operation to create fresh communication channels can be interpreted
as creating fresh secrets. Under this interpretation, though, secrets can be leaked.We then introduce
the notion of groups, which are types for channels, together with an operation for creating fresh
groups. We explain how a fresh secret belonging to a fresh group can never be communicated to
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anybody who does not know the group in the ﬁrst place. In other words, our type system prevents
secrets frombeing leaked. Crucially, groups are not values, and cannot be communicated; otherwise,
this secrecy property would fail.
1.1. Leaking secrets
Consider the following conﬁguration,where P is a private subsystem (a player) running in parallel
with a potentially hostile adversary O (an opponent):
O | P
Suppose that the player P wants to create a fresh secret x. For example, x could be a private
communication channel to be used only between subsystems of P . In the -calculus this can be
done by letting P evolve into a conﬁguration (x)P ′, which means: create a new channel x to be used
in the scope of P ′.
O | (x)P ′
The channel x is intended to remain private to P ′. This privacy policy is going to be violated if
the system then evolves into a situation such as the following, where p is a public channel known
to the opponent (p(y) is input of y on p , and p〈x〉 is output of x on p):
p(y).O′ | (x)(p〈x〉 | P ′′)
In this situation, the name x is about to be sent by the player over the public channel p and
received by the opponent. In order for this communication to happen, the rules of the -calculus,
described in Section 2, require ﬁrst an enlargement (extrusion) of the scope of x (otherwise x would
escape its lexical scope). We assume that x is different from p , y , and any other name in O′, so that
the enlargement of the scope of x does not cause name conﬂicts. After extrusion, we have:
(x)(p(y).O′ | p〈x〉 | P ′′)
Now, x can be communicated over p into the variable y , while keeping x entirely within the scope
of (x). This results in:
(x)(O′{y←x} | P ′′)
where the opponent has acquired the secret.
1.2. Preventing leakage
The private name x has been leaked to the opponent by a combination of two mechanisms:
the output instruction p〈x〉, and the extrusion of (x). Can we prevent this kind of leakage of
information? We have to consider that such a leakage may arise simply because of a mistake in the
code of the player P , or because P decides to violate the privacy policy of x, or because a subsystem
of P acts as a spy for the opponent.
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It seems that we need to restrict either communication or extrusion. Since names are dynamic
data in the -calculus, it is not easy to say that a situation such as p〈x〉 (sending x on a channel
known to the opponent) should not arise, because p may be dynamically obtained from some other
channel, and may not occur at all in the code of P .
The other possibility is to try to prevent extrusion, which is a necessary step when leaking names
outside their initial scope. However, extrusion is a fundamental mechanism in the -calculus: block-
ing it completely would also block innocent communications over p . In general, attempts to limit
extrusion are problematic, unless we abandon the notion of “fresh channel” altogether.
A natural question is whether one could somehow declare x to be private, and have this assertion
statically checked so that the privacy policy of x cannot be violated. To this end, we may consider
typed versions of the -calculus. In these systems, we can classify channels into different groups
(usually called sorts in the literature). We could have a group G for our private channels and write
(x:G)P ′ to declare x to be of sort G. Unfortunately, in standard -calculus type systems all the
groups are global, so the opponent could very well mention G in an input instruction. Global
groups do not offer any protection, because leakage to the opponent can be made to typecheck:
p(y:G).O′ | (x:G)(p〈x〉 | P ′′)
In order to guarantee secrecy, we would want the groupG itself to be secret, so that no opponent
can input names of group G, and that no part of the player can output G information on public
channels.Aﬁrst idea is topartitiongroups intopublic ones and secret ones,with the static constraints
that members of secret groups cannot be communicated over channels of public groups [9]. But this
would work only for systems made of two (or a ﬁxed number of) distrustful components; we aim
to ﬁnd a more general solution.
1.3. Group creation
In general, we want the ability to create fresh groups on need, and then to create fresh elements of
those groups. To this end, we extend the -calculus with an operator, (G)P , to dynamically create
a new group G in a scope P . This is a dynamic operator because, for example, it can be used to
create a fresh group after an input:
q(y:T).(G)P
Although group creation is dynamic, the group information can be tracked statically to ensure
that names of different groups are not confused. Moreover, dynamic group creation can be very
useful: we can dynamically spawn subsystems that have their own pool of shared resources that
cannot interfere with other subsystems (compare with applet sandboxing).
Our troublesome example can now be represented as follows, where G is a new group, G[ ] is the
type of channels of groupG, and a fresh x is declared to be a channel of groupG (the type structure
will be explained in more detail later):
p(y:T).O′ | (G)(x:G[ ])p〈x〉
Here an attempt is made again to send the channel x over the public channel p . Fortunately,
this process cannot be typed: the type T would have to mention G, in order to receive a channel of
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group G, but this is impossible because G is not known in the global scope where p would have to
have been declared. The construct (G) has extrusion properties similar to (x), which are needed
to permit legal communications over channels unrelated to G channels, but these extrusion rules
prevent G from being confused with any group mentioned in the type T .
1.4. Untyped opponents
Let us now consider the case where the opponent is untyped or, equivalently, not well-typed. This
is intended to cover the situation where an opponent can execute any instruction available in the
computational model without being restricted by static checks such as typechecking or bytecode
veriﬁcation. For example, the opponent could be running on a separate, untrusted, machine.
We ﬁrst make explicit the type declaration of the public channel, p :U , which had so far been
omitted. The public channel must have a proper type, because that type is used in checking the
type correctness of the player, at least. This type declaration could take the form of a channel
declaration (p :U) whose scope encloses both the player and the opponent, or it could be part of
some declaration environment shared by the player and the opponent and provided by a third entity
in the system (e.g., a name server).
Moreover, we remove the typing information from the code of the opponent, since an opponent
does not necessarily play by the rules. The opponent now attempts to read any message transmitted
over the public channel, no matter what its type is.
(p :U)( . . . p(y).O′ | (G)(x:G[ ])p〈x〉)
Will an untyped opponent, by cheating on the type of the public channel, be able to acquire secret
information? Fortunately, the answer is still no. The fact that the player is well-typed is sufﬁcient to
ensure secrecy, even in the presence of untyped opponents. This is because, in order for the player
to leak information over a public channel p , the output operation p〈x〉 must be well-typed. The
name x can be communicated only on channels whose type mentions G. So the output p〈x〉 cannot
be well-typed, because then the type U of p would have to mention the group G, but U is not in the
scope of G.
The ﬁnal option to consider is whether one can trust the source of the declaration p :U . This
declaration could come from a trusted source distinct from the opponent, but in general one has to
mistrust this information as well. In any case, we can assume that the player will be typechecked
with respect to this questionable information, p :U , within a trusted context. Even ifU tries to cheat
by mentioning G, the typing rules will not confuse that G with the one occurring in the player as
(G), and the output operation p〈x〉 will still fail to typecheck. The only important requirement is
that the player must be typechecked with respect to a global environment within a trusted context,
which seems reasonable. This is all our secrecy theorem (Section 3) needs to assume.
1.5. Secrecy
We have thus established, informally, that a player creating a fresh groupG can never communi-
cate channels of groupG to an opponent outside the initial scope ofG, either because a (well-typed)
opponent cannot nameG to receive the message, or, in any case, because a well-typed player cannot
use public channels to communicate G information to an (untyped) opponent:
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Channels of group G are forever secret
outside the initial scope of (G).
So, secrecy is reduced in a certain sense to scoping and typing restrictions. But the situation is
fairly subtle because of the extrusion rules associated with scoping, the fact that scoping restrictions
in the ordinary -calculus do not prevent leakage, and the possibility of untyped opponents. As we
have seen, the scope of channels can be extruded too far, perhaps inadvertently, and cause leakage,
while the scope of groups offers protection against accidental or malicious leakage, even though it
can be extruded as well.
We organise the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes the syntax, reduction
semantics, and type system of our typed -calculus with groups. In Section 3 we present Abadi’s
notion of secrecy in terms of the untyped -calculus. We also state the main technical result
of the paper, Theorem 1, that a well-typed process preserves the secrecy of a fresh name of
a fresh group, even from an untyped opponent. We outline the proof of Theorem 1 in Sec-
tion 4; the main idea of the proof is to separate trusted data (from the typed process) and un-
trusted data (from the untyped opponent) using an auxiliary type system deﬁned on untyped
processes. Finally, Section 5 concludes. Appendixes contain proofs omitted from the body of the
paper.
A preliminary version of part of this work appears as a conference paper [6].
2. A typed π -calculus with groups
We present here a typed -calculus with groups and group creation. Milner’s sort system [13,14]
is the earliest type system for the -calculus. Sorts are like groups in that each name belongs to a
sort, but Milner’s system has no construct for sort creation. In our calculus, a replicated process
!(G)(x:G[T ])(P | Q)makes an unbounded number of copies of the pair of processes P andQ, and
our type system guarantees each pair exclusive access to a fresh channel x. Such exclusion does not
follow from Milner’s system, as it is limited to a ﬁxed set of sorts. On the other hand, his system
allows recursive deﬁnitions of sorts; we would need to add recursive types to our system to mimic
such deﬁnitions. Subsequent type systems introduce a variety of channel type constructors and
subtyping [15,16].
2.1. Syntax and operational semantics
Types specify, for each channel, its group and the type of the values that can be exchanged on
that channel.
Types:
T ::= channel type
G[T1, . . . , Tn] polyadic channel in group G
We study an asynchronous, choice-free, polyadic typed -calculus. The calculus is deﬁned as
follows. We identify processes up to capture-avoiding renaming of bound variables.
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Expressions and processes:
x, y , p , q names, variables
P ,Q,R ::= process
x(y1:T1, . . . , yk :Tk).P channel input
x〈y1, . . . , yk〉 channel output
(G)P group creation
(x:T)P restriction
P | Q composition
!P replication
0 inactivity
In a restriction, (x:T)P , the name x is bound in P , and in an input, x(y1:T1, . . . , yk :Tk).P , the names
y1, . . . , yk are bound in P . In a group creation (G)P , the group G is bound with scope P . Let fn(P )
be the set the names free in a process P , and let fg(P ) and fg(T ) be the sets of groups free in a
process P and a type T , respectively.
In the next two tables, we deﬁne a reduction relation P → Q in terms of an auxiliary notion
of structural congruence P ≡ Q. Structural congruence allows a process to be re-arranged so that
reduction rules may be applied. Each reduction derives from an exchange of a tuple on a named
channel.
Our rules for reduction and structural congruence are standard [14] apart from the inclusion
of new rules for group creation, and the exclusion of the usual garbage collection rules such as
0 ≡ (x:T)0 or x /∈ fn(P ) ⇒ (x:T)P ≡ P . Such rules are unnecessary for calculating reduction steps;
their inclusion would not create major problems, but they would slightly complicate the statement
of subject reduction.
Structural congruence: P ≡ Q
P ≡ P (Struct Reﬂ)
Q ≡ P ⇒ P ≡ Q (Struct Symm)
P ≡ Q,Q ≡ R ⇒ P ≡ R (Struct Trans)
P ≡ Q ⇒ (x:T)P ≡ (x:T)Q (Struct Res)
P ≡ Q ⇒ (G)P ≡ (G)Q (Struct GRes)
P ≡ Q ⇒ P | R ≡ Q | R (Struct Par)
P ≡ Q ⇒ !P ≡ !Q (Struct Repl)
P ≡ Q ⇒ x(y1:T1, . . . , yn:Tn).P ≡ x(y1:T1, . . . , yn:Tn).Q (Struct Input)
P | 0 ≡ P (Struct Par Zero)
P | Q ≡ Q | P (Struct Par Comm)
(P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R) (Struct Par Assoc)
!P ≡ P | !P (Struct Repl Par)
x1 /= x2 ⇒ (x1:T1)(x2:T2)P ≡ (x2:T2)(x1:T1)P (Struct Res Res)
x /∈ fn(P ) ⇒ (x:T)(P | Q) ≡ P | (x:T)Q (Struct Res Par)
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(G1)(G2)P ≡ (G2)(G1)P (Struct GRes GRes)
G /∈ fg(T) ⇒ (G)(x:T)P ≡ (x:T)(G)P (Struct GRes Res)
G /∈ fg(P) ⇒ (G)(P | Q) ≡ P | (G)Q (Struct GRes Par)
Reduction: P → Q
x〈y1, . . . , yn〉 | x(z1:T1, . . . , zn:Tn).P → P {z1←y1} · · · {zn←yn} (Red I/O)
P → Q ⇒ P | R → Q | R (Red Par)
P → Q ⇒ (G)P → (G)Q (Red GRes)
P → Q ⇒ (vx :T )P → (vx :T )Q
P ′ ≡ P , P → Q,Q ≡ Q′ ⇒ P ′ → Q′ (Red ≡)
The new rules for group creation are the congruence rules (Struct GRes) and (Red GRes) and
the scope mobility rules are (Struct GRes GRes), (Struct GRes Res), and (Struct GRes Par). The
latter rules are akin to the standard scopemobility rules for restriction, (Struct Res Res) and (Struct
Res Par).
2.2. The type system
Environments declare the names and groups in scope during type-checking; we deﬁne environ-
ments, E, by E ::= ∅ | E,G | E, x:T . We deﬁne dom(E) by dom(∅) = ∅, dom(E,G) = dom(E) ∪ {G},
and dom(E, x:T ) = dom(E ) ∪ {x}.
We deﬁne four typing judgments: ﬁrst, E   means that E is well-formed, that is, that no name
or group appears twice, and that every type in E is well-formed; second, E  T means that every
free group in T is deﬁned in E; third, E  x : T means that x:T is in E, and that E is well-formed;
and, fourth, E  P means that P is well-formed in the environment E.
Throughout the paper, any antecedent of the form E  J1, . . . ,E  Jn means E   when n = 0.
Typing judgments:
E   good environment
E  T good channel type T
E  x : T good name x of channel type T





E  T x /∈ dom(E)
E, x:T  
(Env G)
E   G /∈ dom(E)
E,G  
(Type Chan)
G ∈ dom(E) E  T1 · · · E  Tn
E  G[T1, . . . , Tn]
(Exp x)
E′, x:T ,E′′  
E′, x:T ,E′′  x : T











E  P E  Q





E  x : G[T1, . . . , Tn] E, y1:T1, . . . , yn:Tn  P
E  x(y1:T1, . . . , yn:Tn).P
(Proc Output)
E  x : G[T1, . . . , Tn] E  y1 : T1 · · · E  yn : Tn
E  x〈y1, . . . , yn〉
The rules for good environments ensure that the names and groups declared in an environment
are distinct, and that all the types mentioned in an environment are good. The rule for a good type
ensures that all the groups free in a type are declared. The rule for a good name looks up the type
of a name in the environment. The rules (Proc Input) and (Proc Output) for well-typed processes
ensure that names occurring in inputs and outputs are used according to their declared types. The
rules (Proc GRes) and (Proc Res) allow fresh groups and names, respectively, to be used inside their
scope but not outside. The other rules (Proc Zero), (Proc Par), and (Proc Repl) deﬁne a composite
process to be well-typed provided its components, if any, are themselves well-typed.
2.3. Subject reduction
Subject reduction is a property stating that well-typed processes reduce necessarily to well-typed
processes, thus implying that “type errors” are not generated during reduction. As part of estab-
lishing this property, we need to establish a subject congruence property, stating that well-typing is
preserved by congruence. Subject congruence is essential for a type system based on the -calculus:
two congruent processes aremeant to represent the same computation so they should have the same
typing properties.
As we shall see shortly, a consequence of our typing discipline is the ability to preserve secrets. In
particular, the subject reduction property, together with the proper application of extrusion rules,
has the effect of preventing certain communications that would leak secrets. For example, consider
the discussion in Section 1.3, regarding the process:
p(y:T).O′ | (G)(x:G[ ])P
In order to communicate the name x (the secret) on the public channel p , we would need to reduce
the initial process to a conﬁguration containing the following:
p(y:T).O′′ | p〈x〉
If subject reduction holds then this reduced term has to be well-typed, which is true only if p : H [T ]
for some H , and T = G[ ]. However, in order to get to the point of bringing the input operation
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of the opponent next to an output operation of the player, we must have extruded the (G) and
(x:G[ ]) binders outward. The rule (Struct GRes Par), used to extrude (G) past p(y:T).O′′, requires
that G /∈ fg(T). This contradicts the requirement that T = G[ ].
We prove the following lemma and proposition in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 (Subject congruence). If E  P and P ≡ Q then E  Q.
Proposition 2 (Subject reduction). If E  P and P → Q then E  Q.
Subject reduction allows us to prove secrecy properties such as the following.
Proposition 3. Let the process P = p(y:T).O′ | (G)(x:G[T1, . . . , Tn])P ′. If E  P , for some E, then no
process deriving from P includes a communication of x along p. Formally, there is no process P ′′ and
no context C[ ] such that P ≡ (G)(x:G[T1, . . . , Tn])P ′′, P ′′ →∗ C[p〈x〉], where p and x are not bound
by C[ ].
Proof.Assume that P ′′ and C[ ] exist. Subject reduction implies the judgment E,G, x:G[T1, . . . , Tn] 
C[p〈x〉], which implies that E,G, x:G[T1, . . . , Tn],E′  p〈x〉 for some E′, by induction on the size of
the context. Hence, p has a type H [G[T1, . . . , Tn]]. But this is impossible, since p is deﬁned in E, and
hence is outside the scope of G. 
In the following section we generalize this result, and extend it to a situation where the opponent
is not necessarily well-typed.
3. Secrecy in the context of an untyped opponent
We formalize the idea that in the process (G)(x:G[T1, . . . , Tn])P , the name x of the new group
G is known only within P (the scope of G) and hence is kept secret from any opponent able to
communicate with the process (whether or not the opponent respects our type system). We give a
precise deﬁnition of when an untyped process (x)P preserves the secrecy of a restricted name x
from an opponent (the external process with which it interacts). Then we show that the untyped
process obtained by erasing type annotations and group restrictions from a well-typed process
(G)(x:G[T1, . . . , Tn])P preserves the secrecy of the name x.
3.1. Review: the untyped -calculus
In this section, we describe the syntax and semantics of an untyped calculus that corresponds to
the typed calculus of Section 2. The process syntax is the same as for the typed calculus, except that
we drop type annotations and the new-group construct.
Processes:
x, y , p , q names, variables
P ,Q,R ::= process
x(y1, . . . , yn).P polyadic input
x〈y1, . . . , yn〉 polyadic output
(x)P restriction
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P | Q composition
!P replication
0 inactivity
As in the typed calculus, the names y1, . . . , yn are bound in an input x(y1, . . . , yn).P with scope
P , and the name x is bound in (x)P with scope P . We identify processes up to capture-avoiding
renaming of bound names. We let fn(P ) be the set of names free in P .
Every typed process has a corresponding untyped process obtained by erasing type annotations
and group creation operators. We confer a reduction semantics on untyped processes that corre-
sponds to the reduction semantics for typed processes. To describe the possible external interactions
of a process we recall standard deﬁnitions of labelled input and output transitions.
Reduction: P → Q
x〈y1, . . . , yn〉 | x(z1, . . . , zn).P → P {z1←y1} · · · {zn←yn} (Red I/O)
P → Q ⇒ P | R → Q | R (Red Par)
P → Q ⇒ (x)P → (x)Q (Red Res)
P ′ ≡ P , P → Q,Q ≡ Q′ ⇒ P ′ → Q′ (Red ≡)
Structural congruence: P ≡ Q
P ≡ P (Struct Reﬂ)
Q ≡ P ⇒ P ≡ Q (Struct Symm)
P ≡ Q,Q ≡ R ⇒ P ≡ R (Struct Trans)
P ≡ Q ⇒ (x)P ≡ (x)Q (Struct Res)
P ≡ Q ⇒ P | R ≡ Q | R (Struct Par)
P ≡ Q ⇒ !P ≡ !Q (Struct Repl)
P ≡ Q ⇒ x(y1, . . . , yn).P ≡ x(y1, . . . , yn).Q (Struct Input)
P | 0 ≡ P (Struct Par Zero)
P | Q ≡ Q | P (Struct Par Comm)
(P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R) (Struct Par Assoc)
!P ≡ P | !P (Struct Repl Par)
(x)(y)P ≡ (y)(x)P (Struct Res Res)
x /∈ fn(P ) ⇒ (x)(P | Q) ≡ P | (x)Q (Struct Res Par)
From any typed process, we obtain an untyped -calculus process by erasing type annotations
and group restrictions.
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Erasures of type annotations and group restrictions:
erase((G)P)
"= erase(P) erase((x:T)P) "= (x)erase(P)
erase(0) "= 0 erase(P | Q) "= erase(P) | erase(Q)
erase(!P ) "= !erase(P) erase(x〈y1, . . . , yn〉) "= x〈y1, . . . , yn〉
erase(x(y1:T1, . . . , yn:Tn).P) "= x(y1, . . . , yn).erase(P)
The following proposition shows that although type annotations and group restrictions affect type-
checking, they do not affect the dynamic behaviour of a process. We omit the proof; it proceeds
along the same lines as a similar result for a related calculus [8].
Proposition 4 (Erasure). For all typed processes P and Q, P → Q implies erase(P ) → erase(Q) and
erase(P ) → R implies there is a typed process Q such that P → Q and R ≡ erase(Q).
Finally, we deﬁne input and output transitions to describe the interactions between an un-
typed process and an untyped opponent running alongside in parallel. An input transition P
x−→
(y1, . . . , yn)Q means that P is ready to receive an input tuple on the channel x in the variables
y1, . . . , yn, and then continue as Q. (The variables y1, . . . , yn are bound with scope Q.) An out-
put transition P
x−→ (z1, . . . , zm)〈y1, . . . , yn〉Q means that P is ready to transmit an output tuple
〈y1, . . . , yn〉 on the channel x, and then continue as Q. The set {z1, . . . , zm} ⊆ {y1, . . . , yn} consists of
freshly generated names whose scope includes both the tuple 〈y1, . . . , yn〉 and the process Q. The
names z1, . . . , zm are unknown to the opponent beforehand, but are revealed by the interaction.
Labelled transitions such as these are most commonly deﬁned inductively by a structural op-
erational semantics; for the sake of brevity, the following deﬁnitions are in terms of structural
congruence:
• Let P x−→ (y1, . . . , yn)Q if and only if the names y1, . . . , yn are pairwise distinct, and
there are processes P1 and P2 and pairwise distinct names z1, . . . , zm such that P ≡
(z1, . . . , zm)(x(y1, . . . , yn).P1 | P2) and Q ≡ (z1, . . . , zm)(P1 | P2) where x /∈ {z1, . . . , zm}, and
{y1, . . . , yn} ∩ ({z1, . . ., zm} ∪ fn(P2)) = ∅.
• Let P x−→ (z1, . . . , zm)〈y1, . . . , yn〉Q if and only if the names z1, . . . , zm are pairwise distinct, and
we have P ≡ (z1, . . . , zm)(x〈y1, . . . , yn〉 | Q) where x /∈ {z1, . . . , zm} and {z1, . . . , zm} ⊆ {y1, . . . , yn}.
We deﬁne a (strong, synchronous) bisimilarity on processes as usual [14]: let ∼ be the largest
symmetric relation such that P ∼ Q implies:
(1) whenever P → P ′ there is Q′ with Q → Q′ and P ′ ∼ Q′;
(2) whenever P
x−→ (y1, . . . , yn)P ′ there is Q′ with Q x−→ (y1, . . . , yn)Q′ and for all z1, . . . , zn,
P ′{y1←z1} · · · {yn←zn} ∼ Q′{y1←z1} · · · {yn←zn};
(3) whenever P
x−→ (z1, . . . , zm)〈y1, . . . , yn〉P ′ there isQ′ withQ x−→ (z1, . . . , zm)〈y1, . . . , yn〉Q′ and
P ′ ∼ Q′.
By standard arguments, bisimilarity is a congruence.
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3.2. A secrecy theorem
The following deﬁnition is inspired byAbadi’s deﬁnition of secrecy [2] in the untyped spi calculus
[4]. Abadi attributes the underlying idea to Dolev and Yao [10]: that a name is kept secret from an
opponent if after no series of interactions is the name transmitted to the opponent. (In the presence
of encryption, the deﬁnition is rather more subtle than this.) An alternative we do not pursue here
is to formulate secrecy using testing equivalence [1,4].
We model the external opponent simply by the ﬁnite set of names S known to it. The four rules
displayed below deﬁne a relation (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′) to mean that starting from a process P and
an opponent knowing S , we may reach a state in which P has evolved into P ′, with fresh names
disjoint from the ﬁnite set X , and with the opponent now knowing S ′. The frame X represents the
initial knowledge of the process; it is an upper bound on the set of names that are not fresh, and
always includes fn(P ) (see Lemma 30). We abbreviate the common case X = fn(P ) by deﬁning
(P , S) R (P ′, S ′) to mean (P , S) Rfn(P ) (P ′, S ′).
(1) If fn(P ) ⊆ X then (P , S) RX (P , S).
(2) If (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′) and P ′ → P ′′ then (P , S) RX (P ′′, S ′).
(3) If (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′), P ′
x−→ (y1, . . . , yn)Pˆ , x ∈ S ′, and ({z1, . . . , zn} − S ′) ∩ X = ∅ then (P , S) RX
(Pˆ {y1←z1} · · · {yn←zn}, S ′ ∪ {z1, . . . , zn}).
(4) If (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′), P ′
x−→ (z1, . . . , zm)〈y1, . . . , yn〉Pˆ and x ∈ S ′ and {z1, . . . , zm} ∩ (S ′ ∪ X) = ∅
then (P , S) RX (Pˆ , S ′ ∪ {y1, . . . , yn}).
Clause (1) says that (P , S) is reachable from itself.
Clause (2) allows the process component to evolve on its own.
Clause (3) allows the process to input the tuple 〈z1, . . . , zn〉 from the opponent, provided the
channel x is known to the opponent. The names {z1, . . . , zn} − S ′ are freshly created by the opponent;
the condition ({z1, . . . , zn} − S ′) ∩ X = ∅ ensures these fresh names are not confused with names in
the frame X .
Clause (4) allows the process to output the tuple 〈y1, . . . , yn〉 to the opponent, who then
knows the names S ∪ {y1, . . . , yn}, provided the channel x is known to the opponent. The names
{z1, . . . , zm} (included in {y1, . . . , yn}) are freshly created by the process; the condition {z1, . . . ,
zm} ∩ (S ′ ∪ X) = ∅ ensures these fresh names are not confused with names currently known by the
opponent or in the frame X .
We now deﬁne when a process may reveal a name to an opponent, and its logical negation, when
a process preserves the secrecy of a name:
• P may reveal x to S if and only if there exist P ′ and S ′ such that (P , S) R (P ′, S ′) and x ∈ fn(P ) ∩
(S ′ − S);
• P preserves the secrecy of x from S if and only if for all P ′ and S ′, (P , S) R (P ′, S ′) implies that
x /∈ fn(P ) ∩ (S ′ − S).
By deﬁnition, if P may reveal x to S then x ∈ fn(P ) and x /∈ S . Conversely, if either x /∈ fn(P ) or
x ∈ S then P preserves the secrecy of x from S . Intuitively, a process cannot reveal a name if the
opponent already knows it, or if the process does not itself know it.
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A preliminary version of this paper [6] formulates name revelation using the condition x ∈ fn(S ′)
instead of the condition x ∈ fn(P ) ∩ (S ′ − S) above. According to this variation, a process P may
reveal x to S even though x /∈ fn(P ); for example, P = y(z).0 may reveal x to S = {y} because we can
derive (y(z).0 , {y}) R (0 , {x, y}), where in effect the opponent is allowed to pick x as a fresh name.
Let Q = (w)w〈x〉. We have that Q ∼ 0 and therefore that P | Q ∼ P . But P | Q does not reveal x
to S because x ∈ fn(Q) and therefore the opponent cannot pick it as a fresh name. This example
shows that the deﬁnition with the condition x ∈ S ′ instead of x ∈ fn(P ) ∩ (S ′ − S) is not preserved
by bisimilarity. Preservation by bisimilarity seems a useful guide when formulating secrecy. The
intermediate condition x ∈ fn(P ) ∩ S ′, which allows x to be known initially to the opponent, also
fails to preserve bisimilarity; we would have that P does not reveal x to {x} (because x is not free in
P ) but P | Q does reveal x to {x} (because x is free in Q).
The next proposition, proved in Appendix B, is that the deﬁnitions displayed above of revelation
and secrecy preservation are indeed invariant with respect to bisimilarity.
Proposition 5. Suppose that P ∼ Q. If P may reveal x to S then so does Q. Dually, if P preserves the
secrecy of x from S then so does Q.
Our main technical result formalizes the secrecy property of group creation discussed in
Section 1.
Theorem 1 (Secrecy). Let S be the names occurring in dom(E). Suppose that G ∈ fg(T) and
E  (G)(x:T)P , and hence that x /∈ S. Then the untyped process erase(P) preserves the secrecy of x
from S.
Wegive the proof in the next section. The group restriction (G) is essential. A typingE  (x:T)P
with G ∈ fg(T) does not in general imply that the erasure erase(P) preserves the secrecy of x. For
example, consider the typing ∅,G, y:G[G[ ]]  (x:G[ ])y〈x〉. Then the erasure y〈x〉 reveals x to
S = {y}.
Still, inspired by a result of Sangiorgi and Walker, we can rephrase Theorem 1 without group
restriction as follows. Sangiorgi and Walker’s result [18, Theorem 9.3.1], in a sorted polyadic
-calculus without sort creation, uses sorts to show the secrecy of a restricted name relative to
a well-sorted opponent. Our Theorem 1 is stronger, not only in that it deals with group cre-
ation, but also in that it establishes secrecy relative to an untyped opponent. By reformulating
the premise of Sangiorgi andWalker’s result in our -calculus, we obtain the following corollary of
Theorem 1. In fact, Corollary 1 is effectively a restatement of Theorem 1, as each is a corollary of
the other.
Corollary 1. Let S be the names occurring in dom(E). Suppose G ∈ fg(T) but for every entry x′:T ′
in E, that G /∈ T ′. If E  (x:T)P then the untyped process erase(P) preserves the secrecy of x
from S.
Proof. From E  (x:T)P it follows that E  T , and since G ∈ fg(T), it must be that E = E′,G,E′′.
From E′,G,E′′  (x:T)P and our assumption thatG appears in no type listed in E, we can conclude
E′,E′′,G  (x:T)P by repeated use of the exchange lemmas, Lemmas 13 and 14 in Appendix A. By
(Proc GRes), E′,E′′  (G)(x:T)P . Hence, Theorem 1 implies that erase(P) preserves the secrecy of
x from S . 
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4. Proof of secrecy
The proof of the secrecy theorem is based on an auxiliary type system that partitions channels
into untrusted channels, with type Un, and trusted ones, with type Ch[T1, . . . , Tn], where each Ti is
either a trusted or untrusted type. The type system insists that names are bound to variables with
the same trust level (that is, the same type), and that no trusted name is ever transmitted on an
untrusted channel. Hence an opponent knowing only untrusted channel names will never receive
any trusted name.
For any ﬁxed group G, we can translate group-based types into the auxiliary type system as
follows: any type that does not contain G free becomes Un, while a type H [T1, . . . , Tn] that contains
G free is mapped onto Ch[T ′1 , . . . , T ′n], where the types T ′1 , . . . , T ′n are the translations of the types
T1, . . . , Tn, respectively. This translation is proved to preserve typability. This implies that an oppo-
nent knowing only names whose type does not contain G free, will never be able to learn any name
whose type contains G free. This is the key step in proving the secrecy theorem.
Types:
T ::= channel type
Ch[T1, . . . , Tn] trusted polyadic channel
Un untrusted name
Judgments:
E   good environment
E  x : T good name x of type T





E   x /∈ dom(E)
E, x:T  
(Exp x)
E′, x:T ,E′′  
E′, x:T ,E′′  x : T
(Proc Res)






E  P E  Q





E  x : Ch[T1, . . . , Tn] E, y1:T1, . . . , yn:Tn  P
E  x(y1, . . . , yn).P
(Proc Ch Output)
E  x : Ch[T1, . . . , Tn] E  y1 : T1 · · · E  yn : Tn
E  x〈y1, . . . , yn〉
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(Proc Un Input)
E  x : Un E, y1:Un, . . . , yn:Un  P
E  x(y1, . . . , yn).P
(Proc Un Output)
E  x : Un E  y1 : Un · · · E  yn : Un
E  x〈y1, . . . , yn〉
The auxiliary type system is deﬁned on untyped processes. Any untrusted opponent may be type-
checked, as follows. This propertymakes this system suitable to reason about a systemwhere trusted
and untrusted processes coexist. The proof is by induction on the size of P .
Lemma 6. For all P , if fn(P ) = {x1, . . . , xn} then ∅, x1:Un, . . . , xn:Un  P.
The auxiliary type system enjoys subject congruence and subject reduction. The proofs are in
Appendix C.
Lemma 7 (Subject congruence). If E  P and P ≡ Q then E  Q.
Proposition 8 (Subject reduction). If E  P and P → Q then E  Q.
The following proposition, proved in Appendix D, is the crux of the proof of Theorem 1: an
opponent who knows only untrusted names cannot learn any trusted one.
Proposition 9. Suppose that∅, y1:Un, . . . , yn:Un, x:T  P where T /= Un.Then the process P preserves
the secrecy of the name x from {y1, . . . , yn}.
Next, we translate the types and environments of the -calculus with groups into our auxiliary
system, and state that erasure preserves typing.
Translations of types and environments:
[[H [T1, . . . , Tn]]]G "=
{
Ch[[[T1]]G , . . . , [[Tn]]G] if G ∈ fg(H [T1, . . . , Tn])
Un otherwise
[[∅]]G "= ∅
[[E,H ]]G "= [[E]]G
[[E, x:T ]]G "= [[E]]G , x:[[T ]]G
Appendix D contains a proof of the following:
Proposition 10. If E  P then [[E]]G  erase(P).
WecannowproveTheorem1.Weneed the following lemma,whoseproof is bya routine induction
on the derivation of E, x:T ,E′  P .
Lemma 11. If E, x:T ,E′  P and E  y : T then E,E′  P {x←y}.
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Restatement of Theorem 1. Let S be the names occurring in dom(E). Suppose that G ∈ fg(T) and
E  (G)(x:T)P , and hence that x /∈ S. Then the untyped process erase(P) preserves the secrecy of x
from S.
Proof. Since E  (G)(x:T)P must have been derived using (Proc GRes) and (Proc Res), we have
E,G, x:T  P , with G /∈ dom(E). Hence, [[E]]G = ∅, z1:Un, . . . , zn:Un where S = {z1, . . . , zn}. Proposi-
tion 10 implies that ∅, z1:Un, . . . , zn:Un, x:[[T ]]G  erase(P). Since G ∈ fg(T), [[T ]]G /= Un. So Propo-
sition 9 implies that erase(P) preserves the secrecy of x from S . 
5. Conclusion
We proposed a typed -calculus in which each name belongs to a group, and in which groups
may be created dynamically by a group creation operator. Typing rules bound the communication
of names of dynamically created groups, hence preventing the accidental or malicious revelation of
secrets. We explained these ideas informally, proposed a formalization based on Abadi’s notion of
name secrecy, and explained the ideas underlying the proof.
The idea of name groups and a group creation operator arose in our recent work on type systems
for regulating mobile computation in the ambient calculus [7]. The new contributions of the present
paper are to recast the idea in the simple setting of the -calculus and to explain, formalize, and
prove the secrecy properties inducedby group creation. The typed-calculus of Section 2 is extended
with an effect system to establish a formal connection between group creation and the letregion
construct of Tofte and Talpin’s region-based memory management [20] in another paper [8]. That
other paper generalizes our subject congruence, subject reduction, and erasure results (Lemma 1,
Propositions 2 and 4) to the system of types and effects for the -calculus. We conjecture that the
main secrecy result of this paper, Theorem 1, would also hold for that extended system, but we have
not studied the details.
The idea of proving a secrecy property for a type system by translation into a mixed trusted
and untrusted type system appears to be new. Our work develops the idea of a type system for
the -calculus that mixes trusted and untrusted data, and the idea that every opponent should be
typable in the sense of Lemma 6. These ideas ﬁrst arose in Abadi’s type system for the spi calculus
[1]. In that system, each name belongs to a global security level, such as Public or Secret, but there
is no level creation construct akin to group creation.
A related paper [5] presents a control ﬂow analysis for the -calculus that can also establish
secrecy properties of names. There is an intriguing connection, that deserves further study, between
the groups of our system, and the channels and binders of the ﬂow analysis. One difference between
the studies is that the ﬂow analysis has no counterpart of the construct for group creation of
this paper. Another is that an algorithm is known for computing ﬂow analyses for the -calculus,
whereas we have not investigated algorithmic aspects of our type system. It would be interesting to
consider whether algorithms for Milner’s systems of sorts [12,21] extend to our calculus.
A recent paper [3] presents a type system for establishing secrecy properties in a relative of the
spi calculus without groups but equipped with primitives for public key cryptography. It presents
a useful new deﬁnition of name secrecy based on a reduction relation rather than the labelled
transitions of this paper.
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Other related work on the -calculus includes type systems for guaranteeing locality properties
[17,19]. These systems can type-check whether a name may leak outside a particular locality.
In summary, group creation is a powerful new construct for process calculi. Its study is just
beginning; we expect that its secrecy guarantees will help with the design and semantics of new
programming language features, andwith the analysis of security properties of individual programs.
Appendix A. Type preservation for the main type system
This appendix contains proofs of subject congruence (Lemma 1) and subject reduction (Propo-
sition 2) for the main type system.
Lemma 12. If E, n:T ,m:T ′,E′  J then E,m:T ′, n:T ,E′  J.
Lemma 13. If E,G, n:T ,E′  J and G /∈ fn(T) then E, n:T ,G,E′  J.
Lemma 14. If E,G,G′,E′  J then E,G′,G,E′  J.
Lemma 15. If E, x:T ,E′  J and x /∈ fn(J) then E,E′  J.
Lemma 16. If E,G,E′  J and G /∈ fn(J) ∪ fn(E′) then E,E′  J.
Lemma 17. If E,E′  J and E, x : T ,E′  J′ then E, x : T ,E′  J.
Lemma 18. If E,E′  J and E,G,E′  J′ then E,G,E′  J.
Lemma 19. E,E′  J then E  .
Lemma 20. If E, x:T ,E′  J and E  y : T then E,E′  J{x←y}.
Lemma 21. If E  x : T and E  x : T ′ then T = T ′.
Restatement of Lemma 1. If E  P and P ≡ Q then E  Q.
Proof. The lemma follows by showing that P ≡ Q implies:
(1) If E  P then E  Q.
(2) If E  Q then E  P .
We proceed by induction on the derivation of P ≡ Q.
(Struct Reﬂ) Trivial.
(Struct Symm) ThenQ ≡ P . For (1), assume E  P . By induction hypothesis (2),Q ≡ P implies that
E  Q. Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Trans) Then P ≡ R, R ≡ Q for some R. For (1), assume E  P . By induction hypothesis (1),
E  R. Again by induction hypothesis (1), E  Q. Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Res) Then P = (x:T)P ′ and Q = (x:T)Q′, with P ′ ≡ Q′. For (1), assume E  P . This must
have been derived from (Proc Res), with E, x:T  P ′. By induction hypothesis (1), E, x:T  Q′.
By (Proc Res), E  (x:T)Q′. Part (2) is symmetric.
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(Struct GRes) Then P = (G)P ′ and Q = (G)Q′, with P ′ ≡ Q′. For (1), assume E  P . This must
have been derived from (Proc GRes), with E,G  P ′. By induction hypothesis (1), E,G  Q′. By
(Proc GRes), E  (G)Q′. Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Par) Then P = P ′ | R, Q = Q′ | R, and P ′ ≡ Q′. For (1), assume E  P ′ | R. This must have
been derived from (Proc Par), with E  P ′, E  R. By induction hypothesis (1), E  Q′. By (Proc
Par), E  Q′ | R. Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Repl)ThenP = !P ′,Q = !Q′, andP ′ ≡ Q′. For (1), assumeE  P . Thismusthavebeenderived
from (Proc Repl), with E  P ′. By induction hypothesis (1), E  Q′. By (Proc Repl), E  !Q′. Part
(2) is symmetric.
(Struct Input) In this case, we have P = x(y1:T1, . . . , yk :Tk).P ′, Q = x(y1:T1, . . . , yk :Tk).Q′,
and P ′ ≡ Q′. For (1), assume E  P . This must have been derived from (Proc Input),
with E, y1:T1, . . . , yk :Tk  P ′, E  x : G[T1, . . . , Tn], for some G. By induction hypothesis,
E, y1:T1, . . . , yk :Tk  Q′. By (Proc Input), E  x(y1:T1, . . . , yk :Tk).Q′. Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Par Zero) Then P = P ′ | 0 and Q = P ′.
For (1), assume E  P ′ | 0 . This must have been derived from (Proc Par) with E  P ′.
For (2), assume E  P ′. By Lemma 19, E  . By (Proc Zero), E  0 By (Proc Par), E  P ′ | 0
(Struct Par Comm) Then P = P ′ | P ′′ and Q = P ′′ | P ′.
For (1), assume E  P ′ | P ′′. This must have been derived from E  P ′ and E  P ′′. By (Proc Par),
E  P ′′ | P ′. Hence, E  Q.
Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Par Assoc) Then P = (P ′ | P ′′) | P ′′′ and Q = P ′ | (P ′′ | P ′′′).
For (1), assume E  (P ′ | P ′′) | P ′′′. This must have been derived from (Proc Par) twice, with
E  P ′, E  P ′′, and E  P ′′′. By (Proc Par) twice, E  P ′ | (P ′′ | P ′′′). Hence E  Q.
Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Repl Par) Then P = !P ′ and Q = P ′ | !P ′. For (1), assume E  !P ′. This must have been
derived from (Proc Repl), with E  P ′. By (Proc Par), E  P ′ | !P ′. Hence, E  Q.
For (2), assume E  P ′ | !P ′. This must have been derived from (Proc Par), with E  P ′ and
E  !P ′. Hence, E  P .
(Struct Res Res) In this case we have P = (x1:T1)(x2:T2)P ′ andQ = (x2:T2)(x1:T1)P ′ with x1 /= x2.
For (1), assume E  (x1:T1)(x2:T2)P ′. This must have been derived from (Proc Res) twice, with
E, x1:T1, x2:T2  P ′. By Lemma 12, we have E, x2:T2, x1:T1  P ′. By (Proc Res) twice we have E 
(x2:T2)(x1:T1)P ′. Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Res Par) Then P = (x:T)(P ′ | P ′′) and Q = P ′ | (x:T)P ′′, with x /∈ fn(P ′).
For (1), assume E  P . This must have been derived from (Proc Res), with E, x:T  P ′ | P ′′,
and from (Proc Par), with E, x:T  P ′ and E, x:T  P ′′. By Lemma 15, since x /∈ fn(P ′), we have
E  P ′. By (Proc Res) we have E  (x:T)P ′′. By (Proc Par) we have E  P ′ | (x:T)P ′′, that is,
E  Q.
For (2), assume E  Q. This must have been derived from (Proc Par), with E  P ′ and
E  (x:T)P ′′, and from (Proc Res), with E, x:T  P ′′. By Lemma 17, E, x:T  P ′. By (Proc
Par), E, x:T  P ′ | P ′′. By (Proc Res), E  (x:T)(P ′ | P ′′), that is, E  P .
(Struct GRes GRes) Then P = (G1)(G2)P ′ and Q = (G2)(G1)P ′.
For (1), assume E  (G1)(G2)P ′. This must have been derived from (Proc GRes) twice,
with E,G1,G2  P ′. By Lemma 14 we have E,G2,G1  P ′. By (Proc Res) twice we have
E  (G2)(G1)P ′. Part (2) is symmetric.
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(Struct GRes Res) Then P = (G)(x:T)P ′ and Q = (x:T)(G)P ′ with G /∈ fg(T).
For (1), assume E  (G)(x:T)P ′. This must have been derived from (Proc GRes), with
E,G  (x:T)P ′, and from (Proc Res), with E,G, x:T  P ′. Since G /∈ fg(T) by hypothesis, by
Lemma 13wehaveE, x:T ,G  P ′. Then, by (ProcGRes) and (ProcRes)wehaveE  (x:T)(G)P ′.
Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct GRes Par) Then P = (G)(P ′ | P ′′) and Q = P ′ | (G)P ′′, with G /∈ fg(P ′).
For (1), assume E  P . This must have been derived from (Proc GRes), with E,G  P ′ | P ′′,
and from (Proc Par), with E,G  P ′ and E,G  P ′′. By Lemma 16, since G /∈ fg(P ′), we have
E  P ′. By (Proc GRes) we have E  (G)P ′′. By (Proc Par) we have E  P ′ | (G)P ′′, that is,
E  Q.
For (2), assumeE  Q. Thismust have been derived from (Proc Par), withE  P ′ andE  (G)P ′′,
and from (Proc GRes), with E,G  P ′′. By Lemma 18, E,G  P ′. By (Proc Par), E,G  P ′ | P ′′.
By (Proc GRes), E  (G)(P ′ | P ′′), that is, E  P . 
Restatement of Proposition 2. If E  P and P → Q then E  Q.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of P → Q.
(Red I/O) Then P = x〈y1, . . . , yk〉 | x(z1:T1, . . . , zk :Tk).P ′ and Q = P ′{z1←y1} · · · {zk←yk}. Assume
E  P . This must have been derived from (Proc Par) with E  x(z1:T1, . . . , zk :Tk).P ′ and E 
x〈y1, . . . , yk〉. The former must have been derived from (Proc Input) with E  x : G[T1, . . . , Tk ],
E, z1:T1, . . . , zk :Tk  P ′. The latter judgment E  x〈y1, . . . , yk〉must have been derived from (Proc
Output) with E  x : G[T ′1 , . . . , T ′k ] E  yi : T ′i for each i ∈ 1..k . By Lemma 21, Ti = T ′i for each
i ∈ 1..k . By k applications of Lemma 20, we get E  P ′{z1←y1} · · · {zk←yk}.
(Red Par)HereP = P ′ | RandQ = Q′ | RwithP ′ → Q′.AssumeE  P . Thismust havebeenderived
using (Proc Par) from E  P ′ and E  R. By induction hypothesis, E  Q′. By (Proc Par), E 
Q′ | R, that is, E  Q.
(Red GRes) Here P = (G)P ′ and Q = (G)Q′ with P ′ → Q′. Assume E  P . This must have been
derived using (Proc GRes) from E,G  P ′. By induction hypothesis, E,G  Q′. By (Proc GRes),
E  (G)Q′, that is, E  Q.
(Red Res) Here P = (x:T)P ′ and Q = (x:T)Q′ with P ′ → Q′. Assume E  P . This must have been
derived using (Proc Res) from E, x:T  P ′. By induction hypothesis, E, x:T  Q′. By (Proc Res),
E  (x:T)Q′, that is, E  Q.
(Red ≡) Here P ≡ P ′, P ′ → Q′, and Q′ ≡ Q. Assume E  P . By Lemma 1, E  P ′. By induction
hypothesis, E  Q′. By Lemma 1, E  Q. 
B. Facts needed in proof that bisimilarity preserves secrecy
This appendix contains a proof of Proposition 5, together with auxiliary lemmas. For the sake
of brevity, in this appendix we often use vector notations for name sequences, such as y for y1, . . . ,
yn.
We assert three basic lemmas, which may be proved by routine inductions on the length of
inference of (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′). In the ﬁrst, we can interpret the equation S ′ = S unionmulti SP unionmulti SN asmeaning
that in the ﬁnal state, the knowledge S ′ of the opponent consists of S , the names it knew to begin
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with, plus SP , names known only to P initially, but now revealed, plus SN , fresh names generated
either by P or the opponent. The second and third lemmas state that in some circumstances adding
or removing a name y to the frame does not affect reachability.
Lemma 22. If (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′) then (1) fn(P ) ⊆ X and (2) fn(P ′) ⊆ fn(P ) ∪ S ′ and (3) S ′ = S unionmulti
SP unionmulti SN with SP ⊆ fn(P ) and SN ∩ X = ∅.
Lemma 23. If (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′) and either y /∈ S ′ or y ∈ S then (P , S) RX∪{y} (P ′, S ′).
Lemma 24. If (P , S) RX∪{y} (P ′, S ′) and y /∈ fn(P ) then (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′).
Next, we give a lemma saying that a freshly generated name y can always be renamed to a fresh
name z.
Lemma 25. If (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′ unionmulti {y}) and y /∈ S ∪ X and z /∈ X ∪ S ′ then (P , S) RX
(P ′{y←z}, S ′ unionmulti {z}).
Proof. By induction on the length of inference of (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′ unionmulti {y}). By hypothesis, y /∈ S ∪ X
and z /∈ X ∪ S ′, and we may assume z /= y (or else the claim is trivial) and consider four cases:
(1) We have (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′ unionmulti {y}) from P = P ′, S = S ′ unionmulti {y}, and fn(P ) ⊆ X . But this contradicts
the assumption that y /∈ S ∪ X .
(2) We have (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′ unionmulti {y}) from (P , S) RX (P ′′, S ′ unionmulti {y}) and P ′′ → P ′. By induction
hypothesis, (P , S) RX (P ′′{y←z}, S ′ unionmulti {z}). Substitution preserves reduction, so we have
P ′′{y←z} → P ′{y←z}. Hence, we derive (P , S) RX (P ′{y←z}, S ′ unionmulti {z}).
(3) We have (P , S) RX (Q{y←z}, S ′′ ∪ {z}) from P ′′ x−→ (y)Q, x ∈ S ′′, and ({z} − S ′′) ∩ X = ∅, and
(P , S) RX (P ′′, S ′′), where y ∈ S ′′ ∪ {z} but z /∈ X ∪ S ′′ ∪ {z}. We may assume that the bound
variables y do not include y or z.
Either y ∈ S ′′ or not. If so, we have S ′′ = S ′′′ unionmulti {y} and S ′′′ ⊆ S ′. By induction hypoth-
esis, (P , S) RX (P ′′{y←z}, S ′′′ unionmulti {z}). Substitution preserves transitions, so P ′′{y←z} x{y←z}−→
(y)(Q{y←z}). We calculate:
• x{y←z} ∈ S ′′′ unionmulti {z} (because x ∈ S ′′ = S ′′′ unionmulti {y})
• ({z{y←z}} − S ′′{y←z}) ∩ X = ∅ (because ({z} − S ′′) ∩ X = ∅ and z /∈ X )
• Q{y←z}{y←z{y←z}} = Q{y←z}{y←z}
• (S ′′′ unionmulti {z}) ∪ z{y←z} = (S ′′ ∪ {z}){y←z})
Therefore, (P , S) RX (Q{y←z}{y←z}, (S ′′ ∪ {z}){y←z}), as required.
On the other hand, suppose that y /∈ S ′′, and therefore that y ∈ {z}, but y /∈ fn(Q) (by
Lemma 22, parts (1) and (2)). We have ({z{y←z}} − S ′′) ∩ X = ∅ (because ({z} − S ′′) ∩
X = ∅ and z /∈ X ). Hence, we can derive (P , S) RX (Q{y←z{y←z}}, S ′′ ∪ {z{y←z}}). We
calculate:
• Q{y←z{y←z}} = Q{y←z}{y←z} (because y /∈ fn(Q))
• S ′′ ∪ {z{y←z}} = (S ′′ ∪ {z}){y←z}) (because y /∈ S ′′)
Again, we may conclude (P , S) RX (Q{y←z}{y←z}, (S ′′ ∪ {z}){y←z}).
(4) We have (P , S) RX (Q, S ′′ ∪ {y}) from (P , S) RX (P ′′, S ′′), P ′′ x−→ (z)〈y〉Q, x ∈ S ′′, and {z} ∩
(S ′′ ∪ X) = ∅, with y ∈ S ′′ ∪ {y} but z /∈ S ′′ ∪ {y}.
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Either y ∈ S ′′ or not. If so, note that neither y nor z is among the variables z. By
induction hypothesis, we have (P , S) RX (P ′′{y←z}, S ′′{y←z}). Substitution preserves tran-
sitions, so P ′′{y←z} x{y←z}−→ (z)〈y{y←z}〉(Q{y←z}). We have x{y←z} ∈ S ′′{y←z} (because
x ∈ S ′′). We have {z} ∩ (S ′′{y←z} ∪ X) = ∅ (because {z} ∩ (S ′′ ∪ X) = ∅ and neither y nor
z is among z). We have S ′′{y←z} ∪ {y{y←z}} = (S ′′ ∪ {y}){y←z}. Hence, we can derive
(P , S) RX (Q{y←z}, (S ′′ ∪ {y}){y←z}) as desired.
On the other hand, suppose that y /∈ S ′′ so that y ∈ {y}. By Lemma 22, fn(P ′′) ⊆ S ∪ X , and
by deﬁnition {y} ⊆ fn(P ′′) ∪ {z}. Since y /∈ S ∪ X it must be that y ∈ {z}. By fresh renaming,
we have P ′′ x−→ (z{y←z})〈y{y←z}〉(Q{y←z}). We have {z{y←z}} ∩ (S ′′ ∪ X) = ∅ (because
{z} ∩ (S ′′ ∪ X) = ∅ and z /∈ S ′′ ∪ X ). We have S ′′ ∪ {y{y←z}} = (S ′′ ∪ {y}){y←z} (because
y /∈ S ′′). Hence, we can again derive (P , S) RX (Q{y←z}, S ′′ ∪ {y{y←z}}). 
Using the previous lemmas, we show that adding any name to the frame preserves reachability
in the following sense:
Lemma 26.Suppose (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′).Then for any y there are P ′′, S ′′ such that (P , S) RX∪{y} (P ′′, S ′′)
and X ∩ S ′ = X ∩ S ′′.
Proof. We can assume y /∈ X or else the lemma is trivial. By Lemma 23, if either y /∈ S ′ or y ∈ S
we get (P , S) RX∪{y} (P ′, S ′), and so we are done. Otherwise, we have S ′ = Sˆ unionmulti {y} for some S ′′,
and y /∈ S ∪ X . By Lemma 25, we pick some z /∈ X ∪ S ′, and obtain (P , S) RX (P ′{y←z}, Sˆ unionmulti {z}).
We have y /∈ S ′ unionmulti {z}, so Lemma 23, implies (P , S) RX∪{y} (P ′{y←z}, Sˆ unionmulti {z}). Finally, since neither
y ∈ X nor z ∈ X , we have X ∩ (Sˆ unionmulti {y}) = X ∩ (Sˆ unionmulti {z}). 
An intuition for the next lemma is that the set of names revealed by a transition (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′),
could be deﬁned equally in terms of either fn(P ) or X .
Lemma 27. If (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′) then fn(P ) ∩ (S ′ − S) = X ∩ (S ′ − S).
Proof.ByLemma22,fn(P ) ⊆ X and there areSP andSN such thatS ′ = S unionmulti SP unionmulti SN withSP ⊆ fn(P )
and SN ∩ X = ∅. Now S ′ − S = SP unionmulti SN so fn(P ) ∩ (S ′ − S) = SP = X ∩ (S ′ − S). 
The frame X appearing in the deﬁnition of reachability (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′) is a ﬁnite set of
names, including fn(P ), that cannot be chosen as fresh names. In our deﬁnition of name reve-
lation, we take X = fn(P ). The following lemma, in the style of Gabbay and Pitts’ result about
their freshness quantiﬁer [11], shows that the exact choice of X does not matter so long as
X ⊇ fn(P ).
Lemma 28. These are equivalent:
(1) P may reveal x to S
(2) ∃X ⊇ fn(P ).∃P ′, S ′.(P , S) RX (P ′, S ′) ∧ x ∈ fn(P ) ∩ (S ′ − S)
(3) ∀X ⊇ fn(P ).∃P ′, S ′.(P , S) RX (P ′, S ′) ∧ x ∈ fn(P ) ∩ (S ′ − S)
Proof. We may assume that x ∈ fn(P ) and x /∈ S for otherwise (1), (2), and (3) are false. Hence, it
sufﬁces to show equivalence of the following:
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(R) ∃P ′, S ′.(P , S) Rfn(P ) (P ′, S ′) ∧ x ∈ S ′
(E) ∃n, y1, . . . , yn /∈ fn(P ).∃P ′, S ′.(P , S) Rfn(P )∪{y1,...,yn} (P ′, S ′) ∧ x ∈ S ′
(A) ∀n, y1, . . . , yn /∈ fn(P ).∃P ′, S ′.(P , S) Rfn(P )∪{y1,...,yn} (P ′, S ′) ∧ x ∈ S ′
Wecanobtain (E) from (R) by putting n = 0, and obtain (R) from (E) by n applications of Lemma
24.Moreover,we canobtain (R) from(A)byputtingn = 0, andobtain (A) from(R)bynapplications
of Lemma 26, establishing that (P , S) Rfn(P )∪{y1,...,yn} (P ′′, S ′′) and fn(P ) ∩ S ′ = fn(P ) ∩ S ′′, and
hence that x ∈ S ′′. So all three properties are equivalent. 
We note the following, a corollary by negation:
Lemma 29. These are equivalent:
(1) P preserves the secrecy of x from S
(2) ∀X ⊇ fn(P ).∀P ′, S ′.(P , S) RX (P ′, S ′) ⇒ x /∈ fn(P ) ∩ (S ′ − S)
(3) ∃X ⊇ fn(P ).∀P ′, S ′.(P , S) RX (P ′, S ′) ⇒ x /∈ fn(P ) ∩ (S ′ − S)
The heart of the proof of Proposition 5, below, is that bisimilarity preserves reachability, in the
following sense:
Lemma 30. If (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′) and P ∼ Q and fn(P ) ∪ fn(Q) ⊆ X then there is Q′ such that
(Q, S) RX (Q′, S ′) and P ′ ∼ Q′.
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation of (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′).
(1) We have (P , S) RX (P , S) from fn(P ) ⊆ X . Since fn(Q) ⊆ X we also have (Q, S) RX (Q, S).
(2) We have (P , S) RX (P ′′, S ′) from (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′) and P ′ → P ′′. By induction hypothesis,
(Q, S) RX (Q′, S ′) for some Q′ with P ′ ∼ Q′. Hence, Q′ → Q′′ for some Q′′ with P ′′ ∼ Q′′. So
we can derive (Q, S) RX (Q′′, S ′).
(3) We have (P , S) RX (Pˆ {y←z}, S ′ ∪ {z}) from (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′), P ′ x−→ (y)Pˆ , x ∈ S ′, and
({z} − S ′) ∩ X = ∅. By induction hypothesis, (Q, S) RX (Q′, S ′) for some Q′ with P ′ ∼ Q′.
Hence, Q′ x−→ (y)Qˆ for some Qˆ with Pˆ {y←z} ∼ Qˆ{y←z}. So we can derive (Q, S) RX
(Qˆ{y←z}, S ′ ∪ {z}).
(4) We have (P , S) RX (Pˆ , S ′ ∪ {y}) from (P , S) RX (P ′, S ′), P ′ x−→ (z)〈y〉Pˆ and x ∈ S ′ and {z} ∩
(S ′ ∪ X) = ∅. By induction hypothesis, (Q, S) RX (Q′, S ′) for some Q′ with P ′ ∼ Q′. Hence,
Q′ x−→ (z)〈y〉Qˆ for some Qˆ with Pˆ ∼ Qˆ. So we can derive (Q, S) RX (Qˆ, S ′ ∪ {y}). 
Restatement of Proposition 5. Suppose that P ∼ Q. If P may reveal x to S then so does Q. Dually, if
P preserves the secrecy of x from S then so does Q.
Proof. For the ﬁrst part, let X = fn(P ) ∪ fn(Q). By Lemma 28(1,3), there are P ′ and S ′ such that
(P , S) RX (P ′, S ′) and x ∈ fn(P ) ∩ (S ′ − S). By Lemma 27, x ∈ X ∩ (S ′ − S). By Lemma 30, P ∼ Q
implies there is Q′ such that (Q, S) RX (Q′, S ′) and P ′ ∼ Q′. By Lemma 27, x ∈ fn(Q) ∩ (S ′ − S). By
Lemma 28(1,2), Q may reveal x to S .
The second part is a corollary of the ﬁrst by negation and symmetry. 
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C. Type preservation for the auxiliary type system
This appendix contains proofs of subject congruence (Lemma 7) and subject reduction (Propo-
sition 8) for the auxiliary type system.
Lemma 31. If P ≡ Q then P {x←y} ≡ Q{x←y}.
Lemma 32. If E  J then E  .
Lemma 33. If E′, n:T ′,m:T ′′,E′′  J then E′,m:T ′′, n:T ′,E′′  J.
Lemma 34. If E′, x:T ,E′′  J and x /∈ fn(J) then E′,E′′  J.
Lemma 35. If E  J and E,E′   then E,E′  J.
Lemma 36. If E  x : T and E  x : T ′ then T = T ′.
Restatement of Lemma 7. If E  P and P ≡ Q then E  Q.
Proof. The lemma follows by showing that P ≡ Q implies:
(1) If E  P then E  Q.
(2) If E  Q then E  P .
We proceed by induction on the derivation of P ≡ Q.
(Struct Reﬂ) Trivial.
(Struct Symm) ThenQ ≡ P . For (1), assume E  P . By induction hypothesis (2),Q ≡ P implies that
E  Q. Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Trans) Then P ≡ R, R ≡ Q for some R. For (1), assume E  P . By induction hypothesis (1),
E  R. Again by induction hypothesis (1), E  Q. Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Res) Then P = (x)P ′ and Q = (x)Q′, with P ′ ≡ Q′. For (1), assume E  P . This must have
been derived from (Proc Res), with E, x:T  P ′, for some T. By induction hypothesis (1), E, x:T 
Q′. By (Proc Res), E  (x)Q′. Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Par) Then P = P ′ | R, Q = Q′ | R, and P ′ ≡ Q′. For (1), assume E  P ′ | R. This must have
been derived from (Proc Par), with E  P ′, E  R. By induction hypothesis (1), E  Q′. By (Proc
Par), E  Q′ | R. Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Repl)ThenP = !P ′,Q = !Q′, andP ′ ≡ Q′. For (1), assumeE  P . Thismusthavebeenderived
from (Proc Repl), with E  P ′. By induction hypothesis (1), E  Q′. By (Proc Repl), E  !Q′. Part
(2) is symmetric.
(Struct Input) In this case, we have P = x(y1, . . . , yk).P ′, Q = x(y1, . . . , yk).Q′, and P ′ ≡ Q′. For (1),
assume E  P . This must have been derived either from (Proc Ch Input) or from (Proc Un
Input). In the (Proc Ch Input) case, we have that E  x : Ch[T1, . . . , Tn], for some T1, . . . , Tn, and
E, y1:T1, . . . , yk :Tk  P ′. By induction hypothesis, E, y1:T1, . . . , yk :Tk  Q′. By (Proc Ch Input), E 
x(y1, . . . , yk).Q′.
In the (Proc Un Input) case, we have that E  x : Un, E, y1:Un, . . . , yn:Un  P ′. By induction
hypothesis, E, y1:Un, . . . , yk :Un  Q′. By (Proc Ch Input), E  x(y1, . . . , yk).Q′.
Part (2) is symmetric.
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(Struct Par Zero) Then P = P ′ | 0 and Q = P ′.
For (1), assume E  P ′ | 0 . This must have been derived from (Proc Par) with E  P ′.
For (2), assume E  P ′. By Lemma 32, E  . By (Proc Zero), E  0 By (Proc Par), E  P ′ | 0
(Struct Par Comm) Then P = P ′ | P ′′ and Q = P ′′ | P ′.
For (1), assume E  P ′ | P ′′. This must have been derived from E  P ′ and E  P ′′. By (Proc Par),
E  P ′′ | P ′. Hence, E  Q.
Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Par Assoc) Then P = (P ′ | P ′′) | P ′′′ and Q = P ′ | (P ′′ | P ′′′).
For (1), assume E  (P ′ | P ′′) | P ′′′. This must have been derived from (Proc Par) twice, with
E  P ′, E  P ′′, and E  P ′′′. By (Proc Par) twice, E  P ′ | (P ′′ | P ′′′). Hence E  Q.
Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Repl Par) Then P = !P ′ and Q = P ′ | !P ′. For (1), assume E  !P ′. This must have been
derived from (Proc Repl), with E  P ′. By (Proc Par), E  P ′ | !P ′. Hence, E  Q.
For (2), assume E  P ′ | !P ′. This must have been derived from (Proc Par), with E  P ′ and
E  !P ′. Hence, E  P .
(Struct Res Res) In this case we have P = (x1)(x2)P ′ and Q = (x2)(x1)P ′ with x1 /= x2.
For (1), assume E  (x1)(x2)P ′. This must have been derived from (Proc Res) twice, with
E, x1:T1, x2:T2  P ′, for some T1, T2. By Lemma 33, we have E, x2:T2, x1:T1  P ′. By (Proc Res)
twice we have E  (x2)(x1)P ′. Part (2) is symmetric.
(Struct Res Par) Then P = (x)(P ′ | P ′′) and Q = P ′ | (x)P ′′, with x /∈ fn(P ′).
For (1), assumeE  P .Thismusthavebeenderived from(ProcRes),withE, x:T  P ′ | P ′′, for some
T , and from (Proc Par), with E, x:T  P ′ and E, x:T  P ′′. By Lemma 34, since x /∈ fn(P ′), we have
E  P ′. By (Proc Res) we have E  (x)P ′′. By (Proc Par) we have E  P ′ | (x)P ′′, that is, E  Q.
For (2), assumeE  Q. This must have been derived from (Proc Par), withE  P ′ andE  (x)P ′′,
and from (Proc Res), with E, x:T  P ′′, for some T . By Lemma 17, E, x:T  P ′. By (Proc Par),
E, x:T  P ′ | P ′′. By (Proc Res), E  (x)(P ′ | P ′′), that is, E  P . 
Restatement of Proposition 8. If E  P and P → Q then E  Q.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of P → Q.
(Red I/O) Then P = x〈y1, . . . , yk〉 | x(z1, . . . , zk).P ′ and Q = P ′{z1←y1} · · · {zk←yk}. Assume E  P .
This must have been derived from (Proc Par) with E  x(z1, . . . , zk).P ′ and E  x〈y1, . . . , yk〉. The
former must have been derived either from (Proc Ch Input) or from (ProcUn Input). In the (Proc
Ch Input) case, we have thatE  x : Ch[T1, . . . , Tk ], for some T1, . . . , Tk , andE, z1:T1, . . . , zk :Tk  P ′.
E  x : Ch[T1, . . . , Tk ], and Lemma 36, imply that the latter judgment E  x〈y1, . . . , yk〉must have
been derived from (ProcChOutput), withE  yi : Ti for each i ∈ 1..k . By k applications of Lemma
11, we get E  P ′{z1←y1} · · · {zk←yk}.
In the (Proc Un Input) case, we have E  x : Un, and E, z1:Un, . . . , zk :Un  P ′. E  x : Un, and
Lemma 36, imply that the latter judgment E  x〈y1, . . . , yk〉 must have been derived from
(Proc Un Output), with E  yi : Un for each i ∈ 1..k . By k applications of Lemma 11, we get
E  P ′{z1←y1} · · · {zk←yk}.
(Red Par)HereP = P ′ | RandQ = Q′ | RwithP ′ → Q′.AssumeE  P . Thismust havebeenderived
using (Proc Par) from E  P ′ and E  R. By induction hypothesis, E  Q′. By (Proc Par), E 
Q′ | R, that is, E  Q.
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(Red Res) Here P = (x)P ′ and Q = (x)Q′ with P ′ → Q′. Assume E  P . This must have been
derived using (Proc Res) from E, x:T  P ′, for some T . By induction hypothesis, E, x:T  Q′. By
(Proc Res), E  (x)Q′, that is, E  Q.
(Red ≡) Here P ≡ P ′, P ′ → Q′, and Q′ ≡ Q. Assume E  P . By Lemma 7, E  P ′. By induction
hypothesis, E  Q′. By Lemma 7, E  Q. 
D. Facts needed in proof of the secrecy theorem
This appendix contains proofs of Propositions 9 and 10, used in the proof of Theorem 1, together
with several auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 37. Suppose E  P.
(1) If P
x−→ (y1, . . . , yn)Q and E  x : Un and E  y ′i : Un for each i ∈ 1..n then E  Q{y1←
y ′1} · · · {yn←y ′n}.
(2) If P
x−→ (z1, . . . , zm)〈y1, . . . , yn〉Q and E  x : Un and {z1, . . . , zm} ∩ dom(E) = ∅ then E, z1:Un,
. . . , zm:Un  yi : Un for each i ∈ 1..n, and E, z1:Un, . . . , zm:Un  Q.
Proof. Suppose E  P .
(1) By deﬁnition, P
x−→ (y1, . . . , yn)Q means that the names y1, . . . , yn are pairwise dis-
tinct, and there are processes P1 and P2 and pairwise distinct names z1, . . . , zm with
P ≡ (z1, . . . , zm)(x(y1, . . . , yn).P1 | P2) and Q ≡ (z1, . . . , zm)(P1 | P2) where x /∈ {z1, . . . , zm} and
{y1, . . . , yn} ∩ ({z1, . . . , zm} ∪ fn(P2)) = ∅. Since the names z1, . . . , zm are bound, we may as-
sume that {z1, . . . , zm} ∩ {y ′1, . . . , y ′n} = ∅. By Lemma 31, this and {y1, . . . , yn} ∩ ({z1, . . . , zm} ∪
fn(P2)) = ∅, imply that Q{y1←y ′1} · · · {yn←y ′n} ≡ (z1, . . . , zm)(P1{y1←y ′1} · · · {yn←y ′n} |
P2). By Lemma 7, E  P and P ≡ (z1, . . . , zm)(x(y1, . . . , yn).P1 | P2) imply that E 
(z1, . . . , zm)(x(y1, . . . , yn).P1 | P2). Hence, there are types T1, . . . , Tm with E′  x(y1, . . . , yn).P1
and E′  P2 where E′ = E, z1:T1, . . . , zm:Tm. By assumption and Lemma 35, E′  x : Un.
So, only (Proc Un Input) can derive E′  x(y1, . . . , yn).P1. Hence, we have E′′  P1 where
E′′ = E′, y1:Un, . . . , yn:Un. By assumption, E  y ′i : Un for each i ∈ 1..n. Hence, by Lemmas
35 and 11 we get that E′  P1{y1←y ′1} · · · {yn←y ′n}. By (Proc Par) and (Proc Res), this and
E′  P2 imply that E  (z1, . . . , zm)(P1{y1←y ′1} · · · {yn←y ′n} | P2). Finally, by Lemma 7 we get
E  Q{y1←y ′1} · · · {yn←y ′n}.
(2) By deﬁnition, P
x−→ (z1, . . . , zm)〈y1, . . . , yn〉Q means that the names z1, . . . , zm are pair-
wise distinct with P ≡ (z1, . . . , zm)(x〈y1, . . . , yn〉 | Q) where x /∈ {z1, . . . , zm} and {z1, . . . , zm} ⊆
{y1, . . . , yn}. By Lemma 7, E  P and P ≡ (z1, . . . , zm)(x〈y1, . . . , yn〉 | Q) imply that E 
(z1, . . . , zm)(x〈y1, . . . , yn〉 | Q). Given this and {z1, . . . , zm} ∩ dom(E) = ∅, there are types
T1, . . . , Tm such that E′  x〈y1, . . . , yn〉 and E′  Q where E′ = E, z1:T1, . . . , zm:Tm. By assump-
tion and Lemma 35, E′  x : Un. Therefore only (Proc Un Input) can derive E′  x〈y1, . . . , yn〉
with E′  yi : Un for each i ∈ 1..n. Since {z1, . . . , zm} ⊆ {y1, . . . , yn} it follows that Ti = Un for
each i ∈ 1..m. So E′ = E, z1:Un, . . . , zm:Un, and therefore we have E, z1:Un, . . . , zm:Un  yi : Un
for each i ∈ 1..n, and E, z1:Un, . . . , zm:Un  Q as required. 
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Lemma 38. Consider any process P0 and any set S0. Suppose there is E0 such that E0  P0 and
dom(E0) = fn(P0) ∪ S0 and E0  x : Un for each x ∈ S0. If (P0, S0) R (P ′, S ′) there is E′ such that
E0,E′  P ′ and dom(E0,E′) = fn(P0) ∪ S ′ and E0,E′  x : Un for each x ∈ S ′.
Proof. We assume there is E0 such that E0  P0 and dom(E0) = fn(P0) ∪ S0 and E0  x : Un for
each x ∈ S0. We proceed by induction on the derivation of (P0, S0) R (P ′, S ′). There are four cases
to consider.
(1) We have (P0, S0) R (P0, S0). Take E′ = ∅ and by assumption we have that E0,E′  P0 and
dom(E0,E′) = fn(P0) ∪ S0 and E0,E′  x : Un for each x ∈ S0.
(2) We have (P0, S0) R (P ′, S ′) from (P0, S0) R (P , S ′) and P → P ′. By induction hypothe-
sis, (P0, S0) R (P , S ′) implies there is E′ such that E0,E′  P and dom(E0,E′) = fn(P0) ∪
S ′ and E0,E′  x : Un for each x ∈ S ′. By Proposition 8, P → P ′ implies E,E′ 
P ′.
(3) We have (P0, S0) R (Q{y1←z1, . . . , yn←zn}, S ∪ {z1, . . . , zn}) derived from (P0, S0) R (P , S),
P
x−→ (y1, . . . , yn)Q, x ∈ S , and ({z1, . . . , zn} − S) ∩ fn(P0) = ∅. By induction hypothe-
sis, (P0, S0) R (P , S) implies there is E such that E0,E  P and dom(E0,E) = fn(P0) ∪
S and E0,E  x′ : Un for each x′ ∈ S . Let {z′1, . . . , z′m} = {z1, . . . , zn} − S and let E′ =
E, z′1:Un, . . . , z′m:Un. We have {z′1, . . . , z′m} ∩ fn(P0) = ∅. From dom(E0,E) = fn(P0) ∪ S it
follows that {z′1, . . . , z′m} ∩ dom(E0,E) = ∅, and therefore that E0,E′  . By Lemma
35, this and E0  P imply E0,E′  P . Since x ∈ S , we have E0,E  x : Un, and
hence by Lemma 35, that E0,E′  x : Un. By Lemma 37(1), E0,E′  P and P x−→
(y1, . . . , yn)Q and E0,E′  x : Un and E0,E′  zi : Un for each i ∈ 1..n then E0,E′ 
Q{y1←z1} · · · {yn←zn}. We have dom(E0,E′) = dom(E0,E) ∪ {z′1, . . . , z′m} = fn(P0) ∪ S ∪{z′1, . . . , z′m} = fn(P0) ∪ S ∪ {z1, . . . , zn}. Finally, we have E0,E′  x′ : Un for each x′ ∈ S ∪{z1, . . . , zn}.
(4) Wehave (P0, S0) R (Q, S∪{y1, . . . , yn}) from (P0, S0) R (P , S)andP x−→(z1, . . . , zm)〈y1, . . . , yn〉Q
and x ∈ S and {z1, . . . , zm} ∩ (S ∪ fn(P0)) = ∅. By induction hypothesis, (P0, S0) R (P , S)
implies there is E such that E0,E  P and dom(E0,E) = fn(P0) ∪ S and E0,E  x′ : Un
for each x′ ∈ S . Let E′ = E, z1:Un, . . . , zm:Un. By Lemma 35, we get that E0,E′  x′ : Un
for each x′ ∈ S . By Lemma 37(2), P x−→ (z1, . . . , zm)〈y1, . . . , yn〉Q and E0,E  x : Un
and {z1, . . . , zm} ∩ dom(E0,E) = ∅ imply E0,E′  yi : Un for each i ∈ 1..n, and E0,E′ 
Q. It follows that {y1, . . . , yn} ⊆ dom(E0,E′) = fn(P0) ∪ S ∪ {z1, . . . , zm}. Now, P x−→
(z1, . . . , zm)〈y1, . . . , yn〉Q implies {z1, . . . , zm} ⊆ {y1, . . . , yn}. So fn(P0) ∪ S ∪ {z1, . . . , zm} =
fn(P0) ∪ S ∪ {y1, . . . , yn}. Hence, we have dom(E0,E′) = fn(P0) ∪ S ∪ {z1, . . . , zm} = fn(P0) ∪
S ∪ {y1, . . . , yn}. 
Restatement of Proposition 9. Suppose that ∅, y1:Un, . . . , yn:Un, x:T  P where T /= Un. Then the
process P preserves the secrecy of the name x from {y1, . . . , yn}.
Proof. We may assume x ∈ fn(P ), or else vacuously P preserves its secrecy. Let E = ∅,
y1:Un, . . . , yn:Un, x:T and S = {y1, . . . , yn} so that E  P and dom(E) = fn(P ) ∪ S (since x ∈ fn(P ))
and E  y : Un for each y ∈ S . Consider any process P ′ and S ′ such that (P , S) R (P ′, S ′). By Lemma
38, there is E′ such that E,E′  P ′ and dom(E,E′) = fn(P0) ∪ S ′ and E,E′  y : Un for each y ∈ S ′.
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We know that E,E′  x : T and T /= Un. Therefore, it cannot be that x ∈ S ′, or else we would get
that E,E′  x : Un, which by Lemma 36 is incompatible with E,E′  x : T . Hence, the process P
preserves the secrecy of the name x from {y1, . . . , yn}. 
Lemma 39. If E   then [[E]]G  .
Proof. A routine induction on the derivation of E  . 
Lemma 40. If E  x : T then [[E]]G  x : [[T ]]G.
Proof. Since E  x : T can only derive using (Exp x), E takes the form E′, x:T ,E′′ and E  . By
Lemma 39, [[E]]G  . By deﬁnition, we have [[E]]G = [[E′]]G , x:[[T ]]G , [[E′′]]G . So, by (Exp x), we get
that [[E]]G  x : [[T ]]G . 
Restatement of Proposition 10. If E  P then [[E]]G  erase(P ).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of E  P .
(Proc GRes) Then E  (H)P derives from E,H  P . By induction hypothesis, [[E,H ]]G  erase(P).
Since [[E,H ]]G = [[E]] and erase((H)P) = erase(P), we obtain [[E]]  erase((H)P).
(Proc Res) Then E  (x:T)P derives from E, x:T  P . By induction hypothesis, [[E]]G , x:[[T ]]G 
erase(P). By (Proc Res), [[E]]G  (x)erase(P). Since erase((x:T)P) = (x)erase(P) we get that
[[E]]G  erase((x:T)P).
(Proc Par)ThenE  P | Q derives fromE  P andE  Q. By inductionhypothesis, [[E]]G  erase(P)
and [[E]]G  erase(Q). By (Proc Par), [[E]]G  erase(P) | erase(Q). Since erase(P | Q) = erase(P) |
erase(Q) we get that [[E]]G  erase(P | Q).
(Proc Repl) Then E  !P derives from E  P . By induction hypothesis, [[E]]G  erase(P). By (Proc
Repl), [[E]]G  !erase(P). Since erase(!P ) = !erase(P) we get that [[E]]G  erase(!P ).
(Proc Input) Then E  x(y1:T1, . . . , yk :Tn).P derives from the judgments E  x : H [T1, . . . , Tn]
and E, y1:T1, . . . , yn:Tn  P . By Lemma 40, we get [[E]]G  x : [[H [T1, . . . , Tn]]]G . By induc-
tion hypothesis, we get [[E, y1:T1, . . . , yn:Tn]]G  erase(P), that is, [[E]]G , y1:[[T1]]G , . . . , yn:[[Tn]]G 
erase(P).
If G ∈ fg(H [T1, . . . , Tn]) then [[H [T1, . . . , Tn]]]G = Ch [[[T1]]G , . . . , [[Tn]]G]. Hence, by (Proc Ch
Input) we obtain that [[E]]G  x(y1, . . . , yn).P .
Otherwise, we have G /∈ fg(H [T1, . . . , Tn]) and hence G /∈ fg(Ti) for each i ∈ 1..n. Therefore,
[[H [T1, . . . , Tn]]]G = Un and also [[Ti]] = Un for each i ∈ 1..n. Hence, by (ProcUn Input) we obtain
that [[E]]G  x(y1, . . . , yn).P .
(Proc Output) Then E  x〈y1, . . . , yn〉 derives from E  yi : Ti for each i ∈ 1..n and from
E  x : H [T1, . . . , Tn]. By Lemma 40, we get that [[E]]G  yi : [[Ti]]G for each i ∈ 1..n and
[[E]]G  x : [[H [T1, . . . , Tn]]]G .
If G ∈ fg(H [T1, . . . , Tn]) then [[H [T1, . . . , Tn]]]G = Ch[[[T1]]G , . . . , [[Tn]]G]. Hence, by (Proc Ch
Output) we obtain that [[E]]G  x〈y1, . . . , yn〉.
Otherwise, we have G /∈ fg(H [T1, . . . , Tn]) and hence G /∈ fg(Ti) for each i ∈ 1..n. Therefore,
[[H [T1, . . . , Tn]]]G = Un and also [[Ti]] = Un for each i ∈ 1..n. Hence, by (Proc Un Output) we get
[[E]]G  x〈y1, . . . , yn〉. 
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